Charts · 28

Tests for a mind

Every test for a mind has to decide what counts as evidence. Turing chose conversation; Gallup, a mark on the face; Philip K. Dick, in fiction, a blush. Here are the main tests, measures and arguments from 1950 to 2023, placed on one axis by the evidence they actually inspect: from what something says and does, at the behaviour end, through its body and its brain, to how it is built, at the end that asks whether anyone is there.

Who could take it

11 tests, measures and arguments, 1950 to 2023.

  1. 1What it saysconversation, answers, artefacts

  2. 2What it doesactions and responses

  3. 3How its body reactsinvoluntary physiology

  4. 4What its brain doesneural responses

  5. 5How it is builtcausal structure, architecture

Each entry sits in the column of the evidence it inspects, which is a fact about its method, not a verdict on it. Solid cards are tests or measures used on real subjects; dashed is an argument; the double rule is fiction. Tap any card for what it is after, how it works, and its source.

I made this after building Moth, an autonomous AI cat who draws, makes things and decides for herself. Everything that made me want to say yes, she is conscious, was intelligence: the drawing, the surprise, the sense that she chose. None of it told me whether anyone was home.

Filter by who could take each one. Outside fiction, the tests a machine can sit either judge what it says or rely on a theory of consciousness being right. The two that look for awareness in responses rather than words, the scanner and the magnetic pulse, need a brain.

Notes

The axis is a classification of method, not a ranking: each entry sits in the column of the evidence it inspects, and the placement says nothing about whether the test works. The Chinese room is an argument rather than a test, and the Voigt-Kampff test is fiction; both are marked. “Who could take it” means who it has been or could be given to as designed: integrated information applies to any system in principle, though it can be computed exactly only for very small ones.

Sources, in each card: Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 59:433 (1950); Jones and Bergen, Large language models pass the Turing test (arXiv:2503.23674, 2025; PNAS 2026); Searle, Minds, brains, and programs, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:417 (1980); Bringsjord, Bello and Ferrucci, Minds and Machines 11:3 (2001); Riedl, arXiv:1410.6142 (2014); Schneider and Turner, Scientific American (2017); Gallup, Science 167:86 (1970), and the replications named on the card; Teasdale and Jennett, Lancet 2:81 (1974); Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968); Owen et al., Science 313:1402 (2006); Monti et al., NEJM 362:579 (2010); Casali et al., Science Translational Medicine 5:198ra105 (2013); Casarotto et al., Annals of Neurology 80:718 (2016); Tononi, BMC Neuroscience 5:42 (2004); Cogitate Consortium, Nature 642:133 (2025); Butlin, Long et al., arXiv:2308.08708 (2023).

The caption is from an essay in progress on intelligence and consciousness. Part of a series on perception that grew out of my MA, A Journey Through Light, and the book I kept coming back to while writing it, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?